phd project

On my doctoral project, I’m interested about questions on simple forms of reasoning (like heuristics) and how these are to be understood if we want to explain what we believe and how (or even whether) we are rational. As it turns out, these questions have also been asked by people in other areas, so I want to see what they have to say and how they can help me to better ask my questions.

More specifically, I’m interested in what sense are we rational to simplify tasks of reasoning such as prediction tasks or calculation tasks. Psychologists have been studying these under the label of heuristics and some consider them cases of irrationality. However these can be understood, I think we need more nuanced views of what a capacity to be rational means to fully explain simplified reasoning. I also think that if we can successfully show that instances of heuristics are rational we can make progress in answering questions about the nature of belief and how it relates to degrees of belief (or ‘credences’).

work in progress

  • A paper on the rationality of the representativeness heuristic (pdf).
  • A paper on the Lockean theory of evidence.
  • A paper on relativism, retraction and resistance from a speech-act theorist point of view.
  • A paper, in Spanish, on the weakness of belief in Spanish.


  • “Expresivismo sobre la credibilidad, Workshop (híbrido) Lenguaje, acción y expresividad, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, 12 de diciembre 2023.(handout)
  • “Rational Simplified Reasoning in Beliefs, SOPhiA Conference, Salzburg 2023.(slides)
  • “Higher-order doubts in Simplified Reasoning” Workshop in Theoretical Philosophy, TU Dresden, July 2023.(slides)
  • “Making Sense of Representativeness”, EpiJust2023, LMU, München, March 2023. (slides)
  • “Simplified (Epistemically) Rational Reasoning”, Workshop in Theoretical Philosophy, TU Dresden, January 2023. (slides)